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AMBIGUOUS WIRE INSTRUCTIONS: ROYAL BANK OF CANADA V.
STANGL
In carrying out wire instructions to credit an account of its
customer (the "beneficiary") the beneficiary's bank1 is bound by
the beneficiary's description contained in the wire instructions.
Payment must strictly be made to this beneficiary alone.2 A
beneficiary may be identified in the wire instructions by name,
account number or both. The position of a beneficiary's bank
receiving wire instructions containing an ambiguous description of
the beneficiary was recently dealt with by Ferrier J. in Royal Bank
of Canada v. Stangl.3
The Facts
The pertinent facts of the case were as follows. On December
16, 1987, at 5:45 p.m., after the close of business, the Royal Bank
of Canada (Royal Bank) received telex instructions from the
National Bank of Industry and Commerce Ltd., Guyana
(National Bank) to "pay the Toronto-Dominion Bank U.S.
$47,228.62, address 5100 Dixie Road, Mississauga, Ontario,
Canada, account number 916327 N/O Lynwil International
Trading Incorporated". The remitter was Guyana Mining Enter-
prises Ltd., Guyana (Guyana Mining). 4 The following day,
through the usual international banking facilities, the Royal Bank
instructed the Toronto Dominion Bank (TD Bank) accordingly.
In fact, account number 916327 at the Toronto Dominion Bank,
5100 Dixie Road, Mississauga (TD Mississauga) belonged to
Unitec Welding Alloys Limited (Unitec) and not to Lynwil Inter-
national Trading Inc. (Lynwil). However, another account of
Unitec at TD Mississauga was in the name of Linwell International.
Unitec and Lynwil, together with two sister companies of Lynwil,
were suppliers of Guyana Mines. Dealings and payment arrange-
ments between Guyana Mining and these suppliers were not kept
strictly separate or distinct.
'In general, the beneficiary's bank is the bank identified in the wire instructions in which
payment into an account is to be made. The beneficiary is the holder of that account.
2 This underlies Clansmen Resources Ltd. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, [1990] 4 W.W.R.
73,43 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273 (C.A.).
3 (1992), 32 A.C.W.S. (3d) 17 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) [092/066/089-19]. While on appeal,
the case was recently settled.
4 Ile judgment refers to this party either as "Guyana Mines" or "Guyana Mining".
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Lynwil did not have an account at TD Mississauga. Rather, it
had an account with the TD Bank in Pickering (TD Pickering). 5 For
its part, Unitec had three accounts at TD Mississauga as follows:
(1) Account No. 7300254 - a U.S. dollar account in the name of
Unitec;
(2) Account No. 916327- a Canadian dollar account in the name
of Unitec; and,
(3) Account No. 627902 - in the name of Linwell International,
which purported to be the trading style of Unitec. The report
does not specify the currency of that account and nothing turns
on it in the judgment.
On two previous occasions, wire transfers were made to TD
Mississauga according to instructions containing the same account
number in Lynwil's name, and no difficulties arose. In the case at
bar, on receipt of the wire transfer, an employee of TD Mississauga
telephoned Unitec to advise receipt of the funds and inquired to
which account the funds should be deposited. Unitec advised the
employee to deposit the funds to the U.S. dollar account (and not
into account no. 916327 as in the Royal Bank's instructions). This
was done and Unitec's dollar account (no. 7300254) showed the
deposit on December 17th on the bank statement for the month
ending December 31, 1987. As was indicated by the court,
"6nothing turns on the fact that the funds were deposited to the
U.S. account as opposed to account #9126327, the Canadian
dollar account. If the funds were deposited to the credit of the
correct beneficiary, that beneficiary could direct to which account
they were deposited". 6
That day (December 17th), the Royal Bank received a further
telex from the National Bank cancelling the instructions received
on December 16th and requesting payment into Lynwil's account
with TD Pickering. The instructions explicitly cautioned the Royal
Bank to avoid all possible duplication. However, this telex came
5 In fact, there were two Lynwil companies. One was Lynwil International Trading Incor-
porated. The other was Lynwil International Inc. Both were controlled by one person
(Lyndon Thomas). The former company was the beneficiary of the telex instructions
received by the Royal Bank on December 16th. The latter was the account holder in TD
Pickering. Nothing in the judgment turned on the existence of two separate Lynwil
entities. Both companies are thus considered here as one Lynwil entity.
6 Supra, footnote 3, at p. 6 of the judgment.
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too late to reverse the payment to Unitec. Due to the internal
investigation at the Royal Bank and the Christmas recess, the
telex instructing payment to Lynwil at TD Pickering was only acted
on on December 29, 1987. In effect, the Royal Bank acted on the
second telex, not realizing that the first payment had actually
taken place. The fact that two payments had been made came to
light only in February, 1988. The TD Bank declined to reverse the
transfer and to debit Unitec's account. The Royal Bank sued both
the TD Bank and Unitec. 7 The TD Bank counterclaimed against
Unitec for indemnity in the event that it was found liable to the
Royal Bank.
judgment
The Royal Bank won against both defendants and the TD Bank
won against Unitec. The claim and counterclaim against Unitec
were on the basis of unjust enrichment. Unitec's defence, based
on Barclays Bank Ltd. v. W.J. Simms Son and Cooke (Southern)
Ltd. ,8 was that the payment by Guyana Mining was made "for
good consideration, and in particular to discharge a debt owed to
Unitec by Guyana Mines".9 Accepting the validity in principle of
such a defence,10 Ferrier J. rejected its application in the case at
bar, since Unitec "has failed to meet the onus of establishing on
the balance of probabilities that [such] a debt was owing. . .".u He
thus held against Unitec and in favour of each of the two banks. 12
In rejecting the discharge defence so as to allocate the loss
ultimately on Unitec, this aspect of the judgment is well
founded. 13
The Royal Bank's action against the TD Bank was in negligence.
7 The Royal Bank also sued Joseph Stangl, president and major shareholder of Unitec and
Lynwil. Both actions were dismissed and are of no concern to us.
8 [198011 Q.B. 677,695.
9 Supra footnote 3, at p. 13 of the judgment. For the interchangeability between "Guyana
Mining" and "Guyana Mines", see footnote 4, supra.
10 For a recent recognition of this defence in the U.S., see e.g. Banque Worms v. Bank of
America International 77 N.Y. 2d 362 (1991). It is possible, however, that a valid defence
requires a change of position, and not mere discharge of a debt. See e.g. Morgan
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Outerbridge (1990), 66 D.L.R. (4th) 517, 72 O.R. 161 (H.C.J.).
This aspect is outside the scope of this note.
11 Supra, footnote 3, at p. 16 of the judgment.
12 Had both banks failed against Unitec, recourse by the losing bank would have been
against the overseas originator of the funds transfer, Guyana Mining.
13 However, Unitec appealed against the trial judge's judgment.
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In holding for the Royal Bank, Ferrier J. concluded that "the
initial depositing of the funds and the continuing actions of the TD
in refusing or failing to reverse the transaction caused the loss to
the Royal Bank". 14 More specifically,
15
the depositing of the funds by the T.D. Mississauga to an account which was
not in the name of the beneficiary described in the wire transfer was negli-
gence. The fact that company names are often shortened or misspelled does
not lower the standard of care required of a bank - if anything, such a fact
should put a bank on guard to ensure that funds are being correctly
deposited in accordance with instructions received. The T.D. Mississauga
ought to have sought [from its sender] clarification in the instructions before
acting.
In addition, when the error was brought to its attention by the Royal
Bank, the TD Mississauga could have, and should have, reversed the trans-
action by debiting the account of its customer. Its failure to do so was
negligence...
It would follow therefore that the TD Bank was held liable on
two counts of negligence. First, it paid the wrong beneficiary.
Second, it failed to reverse the transfer once the error had been
brought to its attention. Due to this negligence, the Royal Bank
suffered a loss. This aspect of the judgment merits further
analysis.
Discussion
At first blush, in requiring the TD Bank to ensure that the
beneficiary's name and account number matched, the court
appears to follow American pre-ucc Article 4A cases. 16 UCC
§4A-207(b)(1) reversed these cases. 17 However, Stangl may
appear to be consistent also with the ucc. This is because Ucc
§4A-207(b) only permits a beneficiary's bank to act solely on the
account number, without matching it with the beneficiary's name,
where the beneficiary's bank is unaware of any discrepancy
between the name and number. Under ucc §4A-207(b)(2), where
the beneficiary's name and account number identify different
persons, and the beneficiary's bank pays either to the named
14 Supra, footnote 3, at p. 11 of the judgment.
15 Ibid. at p. 9, emphasis added.
16 See Securities Fund Service v. American National Bank, 542 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill,
1982), and Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas American Bank, 790 F. 2d 407(5th Cir., 1986).
17 See B. Geva, The Law of Electronic Funds Transfers, (New York, Matthew Bender,
1992: updated annually), §2.07[3].
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beneficiary, or into the account specified in the instructions with
knowledge of the discrepancy, the beneficiary's bank is not
protected, unless payment was actually made to the person
entitled to receive payment from the originator of the funds
transfer (in our case, Guyana Mining). Nonetheless, unlike
Stangl, under ucc §4A-207(b), the beneficiary's bank need not
determine whether the beneficiary's name and account number
refer to the same person. Nor is it required to seek further instruc-
tions from the sender. In case of a discrepancy, it may either reject
the payment order embodied in the wire instructions and
containing the ambiguous instructions 18 or it may simply decline to
act on it, in which case the instructions will expire automatically
within five days. 19 But under both ucc §4A-207(b) and Stangl,
payment to the account identified in the instructions with
knowledge of the discrepancy between the name and the number
is wrongful.
Further reflection leads me to conclude however, that Stangl
was wrongly decided on the basis of negligence and that it would
also have been decided differently under ucc Article 4A. First,
the application of negligence principles in Stangl is not free from
doubt. This was not a case of a beneficiary's bank automatically
processing payment into an account on the basis of account
number only.2° Rather, the TD Bank exercised some discretion
and judgment in deciding to make payment to Unitec. Not only
that: on two previous occasions similar performance of identical
instructions caused no difficulty, but one of Unitec's accounts was
in the name of "Linwell International", which is not all that
different from "Lynwil International"! Indeed, the similarity
between the two names, together with the existence of an account
numbered as instructed by the sender and belonging to the
apparent beneficiary, should have afforded the TD Bank adequate
protection. 21
Second, it is quite likely that an American court applying uCC
18 For rejection under UCC §4A-210 see Geva, ibid., §2.03[4].
19 For cancellation by operation of law (five days after the payment date) under ucc
§4A-211(d) see Geva, ibid., §§2.03[41 and 2.08[3]. Note that where the beneficiary is
"unidentifiable", the sender's payment (under s. 4A-209(b)(2) and (3)) will not lead to
acceptance by beneficiary's bank (s. 4A-207).
20 As were the cases cited, supra, footnote 16.
21 Similar to the protection accorded to a bank of deposit receiving a cheque where the
endorser's name is misspelled. Cf. Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4, s. 165(3).
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§4A-207(b) would find the situation as not being a case where the
beneficiary's bank knows of an inconsistency between a name and
account number, or as not being a case where the name and
number identify different persons. Indeed, inasmuch as payment
was made to the holder of account No. 916327, and in the absence
of knowledge of the discrepancy between name and number, the
better view seems to be that the beneficiary's bank should be
protected under ucc §4A-207(b)(1). In this context, it should be
recalled that Lynwil did not even have an account at TD Missis-
sauga so as to alert the branch to a possible conflict.
In effect, so far as TD Mississauga was concerned, the ambiguity
in the wire instructions was not that the numbered account did not
belong to the named payee. The ambiguity was rather in the
misspelling of the payee's name ("Lynwil" instead of "Linwell"),
as well as in the fact that the numbered account was under a
different name from what TD Mississauga erroneously assumed to
be the same beneficiary. From this perspective, this was an issue to
be settled with the beneficiary and not with the sender. Indeed,
the error was made by the originator of the funds transfer, Guyana
Mining. To require a beneficiary's bank to query to the overseas
originator about a mere misspelling of a beneficiary's name, a
known customer of the beneficiary's bank, is quite inconsistent
with the speed and efficiency expected from the wire transfer
payment.
Fastening on a beneficiary's bank a duty to match name and
number may not be consistent with the real world of automated
processing of wire instructions. This policy underlies ucc
§4A-207's 22 dispensing with such an obligation. 23 But regardless of
whether or not such duty exists under Canadian law, the TD Bank
should not have been liable for payment to the wrong beneficiary.
It either acted with care, or without knowledge of the inconsis-
tency, assuming such an inconsistency existed at all.
This leaves us with the second count of negligence, that is, the
TD Bank's failure to reverse the transfer upon learning of the
mistake, at least six weeks after the transfer. However, by
reversing the transfer at that point, the TD Bank might have
become exposed to Unitec's claim, if Unitec had been successful in
raising the plea of discharge of a debt owed to it by Guyana
Mining.24 Cognizant of such a result, ucc §4A-211(c)(2) does not
22 Official Comment 2 to Ucc §4A-207.
23 See text around footnotes 17 to 19, supra.
24 For this defence and its disposition by the court, see text around footnotes 8 to 13, supra.
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require the beneficiary's bank to concur with a post-completion
cancellation on the basis of mistaken payment instructions.
Usually, for post completion cancellation, the agreement of the
beneficiary's bank is specifically required. Depending on how far
it is prepared to rely on its sender's liability for any loss or
expenses under ucc §4A-211(f), the beneficiary's bank is free, at
its own discretion, to provide or withhold its consent to the post
completion reversal. 25
In appearing to restrict the post-completion power of the TD
Bank, as a beneficiary's bank, to reverse only a mistaken (or
possibly also unauthorized) payment, 26 Stangl need not be taken
to undermine finality of payment 27 altogether. Even accepting the
existence of such a restriction on the post completion reversing
power of the beneficiary's bank, in purporting to bypass the
agreement of the beneficiary's bank, the final decision unneces-
sarily exposed the TD Bank to an unwarranted risk.
Finally, in my view, the court was too lenient with the Royal
Bank. Once the Royal Bank had carried out the original wire
instructions (received on December 16th), it was not bound to act
on the second telex (received on December 17th), without
ensuring the reversal of the earlier funds transfer to TD
Mississauga. 28 However, it initiated the transfer to TD Pickering
only on December 29th. While the delay might be acceptable by
itself,29 overlooking the possibility of a double payment at that
point may not. In fact, the occurrence of such a double payment
was only discovered by the Royal Bank in February. The evidence
showed that a second payment would only have been directed if
the first one had not been made. From a comparative point of
view, the Royal Bank's negligence, and its contribution to the loss,
appears to have been greater than that of the TD Bank. Had the
Royal Bank declined payment the second time around it would
not have incurred the loss. Arguably, then, the erring originator
(Guyana Mining), whose fault triggered the entire unfortunate
chain of events, would not be well positioned to recover from the
TD Bank. 30 Of course, this does not undermine the Royal Bank's
25 See in general, Geva, supra, footnote 17, at §2.08[5].
26 As at uCc §4A-211(c)(2).
27 That is the irreversibility of credit once posted to the beneficiary's account. See in
general, Geva, supra, footnote 17, at §2.12[4].
28 See in general, Royal Products Ltd. v. Midland Bank Ltd., [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 194
(Q.B.).
29 See text preceding footnote 7, supra.
30 Cf. Bradford, supra, footnote 16, exonerating the beneficiary's bank that did not match
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action, or that of the originator, against Unitec in unjust
enrichment; it nevertheless undermines the basis of the Royal
Bank's action against the TD Bank.
Practically speaking, the safest course for a beneficiary's bank
which receives ambiguous instructions is to reject them
altogether. However, on occasion, this may be against its best
business judgment. Having exercised discretion and acted
diligently to resolve the ambiguity, the beneficiary's bank ought to
be protected even where it resolved the ambiguity incorrectly.
This ought to be so at least where the ambiguity does not amount
to irreconcilable inconsistency. This was the case here, where it
was plausible to believe that the beneficiary's name was misspelled
and not that it referred to someone other than the account
holder. 31 Accordingly, the TD Bank should have been protected in
Stangl as against the action of the erring originator as well as
against that of the negligent intermediary bank. Unfortunately,
Ferrier J. reached the opposite result.
On the facts of the case, fastening liability on the TD Bank can
be rationalized only because it was in a better position than the
Royal Bank to recover the erroneous payment from Unitec.
However, the theory of such recovery would be in restitution, and
is unrelated to the negligence of the beneficiary's bank.32 This
rationale also presupposes the absence of defences in restitution 33
and would lead to injustice where recovery from the beneficiary is
not feasible. 34 In any event, no such line of reasoning appears in
Ferrier J.'s judgment.
Conclusion
Overall, the judgment is well reasoned. In dismissing Unitec's
beneficiary's name and account number, from liability to the negligent originator's bank
that dealt with the imposter initiating the transfer.
31 Conversely, an irreconcilable inconsistency would occur when the name and account
number identify two different beneficiaries and there is no similarity whatsoever between
the name of the beneficiary identified at the payment order and the account holder.
32 The correct plaintiff in such an action would be the originator or a sending bank subro-
gated to it.
33 Cf. A.N.Z. v. Westpac (1988), 78 A.L.R. 157 (H.C. Aust.) dealing with the liability of
the beneficiary's banks for overpayment resulting from carrying out an erroneous
payment order.
34 This may be why Article 4A disfavours recovery by an erring executing bank from the




defence, it is correct on the unjust enrichment point. Without the
benefit of extensive jurisprudence, it is facially persuasive, though
ultimately, in my view, incorrect, on the first count of negligence
against the TD Bank. With respect to both counts of negligence, as
well as causation, the judgment fails to appreciate fully the reality
of funds transfer practice.
Stangl demonstrates the inadequacy of the common law
methodology in failing to provide a comprehensive set of rules
governing funds transfers and the urgent need for a legislative
solution. 35 One may speculate that the TD Bank resisted the Royal
Bank's claim in order to accommodate Unitec, the TD Bank's
customer. However, once Unitec lost and as long as Unitec
returns the funds, the TD Bank ends up without any out of pocket
loss. The entire discussion of the TD Bank's liability thus becomes
irrelevant for the allocation of the ultimate loss, at least where
recovery from Unitec is feasible. Nonetheless, Ferrier J.'s obser-
vations as to the duties of the beneficiary's bank unfortunately
remain the final word on the topic, at least for the time being.
Benjamin Geva*
3 5 Such as UCC Article 4A or uNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers.
*Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
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